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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20010812-CA

vs.
DAMON R. MUNFORD,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the evidence was insufficient to support Munford's conviction for

murder? "To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict,
the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and
them demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, 114, 989 P.2d 1065.
Because this issue was not preserved below, it is reviewed for plain error. State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 111, 10 P.3d 346.
2.

Whether Munford's counsel's failure to make a motion for directed verdict

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel? The claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel for "failing to make a motion for directed verdict succeeds only if the State's
evidence was not sufficient to support a conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310
1

(memorandum decision); see Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993). Where
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal,
the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Utah
App. 1994).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Damon R. Munford appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the

Third District Court after a conviction of murder, a first degree felony.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Damon R. Munford was charged by information filed in Third District Court

with murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-203 (R.
2-6).
After a preliminary hearing, Munford was bound-over for trial upon a finding of
probable cause (R. 23-25). Prior to trial, the trial court granted Munford's motion to
sever his trial from that of his co-defendant, John Kiriluk (R. 38-41, 53). After a twoday trial, Munford was convicted by a jury (R. 112, 204-05). Munford was sentenced
to five years to life in the Utah State Prison and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and
restitution to the victim's family in the amount of $1,600 (R. 116).
2

Approximately two years after sentencing, Munford filed a pro se motion for
resentencing on the grounds that his trial counsel failed to file a timely notice of appeal
(R. 125-28). The trial court denied the motion and Munford appealed (R. 129-30, 13334). On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Third District for
resentencing (R. 162). Munford was then resentenced and filed a timely notice of
appeal with the Third District Court (R. 173-76). The appeal was then transferred to
this Court from the Utah Supreme Court (R. 190-91).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In the case below, the State alleged that the appellant, Damon Munford, caused
the death of Michael Brown (R. 5-6). The matter was set for trial which began on
November 6, 1996. In support of its case, the state called six witnesses. Munford did
not present a defense.

A. Testimony of Jack Retallick
Jack Retallick testified that he was the victim's father-in-law (R. 204: 81).
Retallick described Brown as a twenty three year old man standing about six feet one
inch at about two hundred pounds (R. 204: 83). Despite Brown's imposing physique,
Retallick considered him to be gentle and easy-going (R. 204: 83). He also described
Brown as learning disabled who functioned on about a 12 to 16 year old level (R. 204:
83). Retallick also testified that from time to time Brown would wear a baseball hat,
carried a Harley-Davidson wallet with a chain on it, and wore several rings (R. 204:
88-89).
3

carried a Harley-Davidson wallet with a chain on it, and wore several rings (R. 204:
88-89).
The State elicited that Retallick was with Brown in Retallick's home on the
evening of March 21, 1986 (R. 204: 83). At some point during the evening two men
showed up at the house (R. 204: 83). The two men came downstairs and met Retallick
and Brown (R. 204: 83). Brown introduced one of the men as "John" however he
"didn't really say who the other guy was" (R. 204: 83). Brown spoke with the two
visitors for about ten minutes and the left with them (R. 204: 83-4).
During the course of the examination the State showed Retallick two pictures
which it asserted were of Munford (R. 204: 86-7). Retallick testified that the person
depicted in the pictures was Munford, one of the people who came to his home and met
with Brown on the evening of March 21, 1986 (R. 204: 86). Retallick did not see
Brown after that evening (R. 204: 89).

B. Testimony of Jo Lynn Penrod
Jo Lynn Penrod testified that she rented a room from John Kiriluk and was his
roommate (R. 204: 93). Penrod testified that she knew Munford and his wife Rebecca
Munford through her association with Kiriluk (R. 204: 94-5). According to Penrod,
Munford was Kiriluk's buddy or partner (R. 204: 95). Penrod also knew Brown whom
she met though Kiriluk (R. 204: 95).
Penrod testified that approximately two weeks before March 21, 1996, Kiriluk
became angry with Brown (R. 204: 96). Penrod testified that at this time, she
overheard Kiriluk state that he was going to kill Brown (R. 204: 97). Penrod testified
that Munford was present when Kiriluk made these statements (R. 204: 97).
4

The discontent between Kiriluk and Brown stemmed from some missing
propynyl (R. 204: 97-9). Propynyl is a chemical that can be used to manufacture
methamphetamine (R. 204: 98). According to Penrod, Kiriluk had an amount of the
chemical which he gave to Brown (R. 204: 98). Brown, in turn, was to give the
propynyl to a person named Hoge who was going to use the chemical to make
methamphetamine (R. 204: 98). Kiriluk apparently believed Brown did not give the
chemical to Hoge (R. 204: 97). To compound things, Penrod understood that Kiriluk
still owed money for the chemical (R. 204: 99). Kiriluk was worried that if he could
not pay for the propynyl his source for the chemicals would "come after him" (R. 204:
99). Penrod testified that she believed Munford was present when Kiriluk relayed these
facts (R. 204: 99).
Penrod further testified that she was at her apartment on the evening of March 2
1, 1996 (R. 204: 100). When she arrived, Penrod saw Kiriluk, Brown, and Munford
in the back of a truck (R. 204: 100). Penrod testified that she also saw Chablis Scott
(Kiriluk's girlfriend) and Rebecca Munford in the front of the truck (R. 204: 100).
Penrod believed the truck belonged to Munford (R. 204: 100). Kiriluk spoke with
Penrod and told her they were going to play pool and they left, leaving Penrod behind
(R. 204: 100).

C. Testimony of Chablis Scott
Chablis Scott testified that she had been Kiriluk's girlfriend for several months
(R. 204: 108). Scott also knew Munford and his wife whom she met through Kiriluk

5

(R. 204: 108-9). According to Scott, Munford was Kiriluk's "backup, his tough guy"
(R. 204: 109).
Scott testified that Kiriluk was upset with Brown because Kiriluk had given
Brown some proprynyl who in turn gave it to Hoge and then at some point the propynyl
had disappeared (R. 204: 111). Scott stated that Munford was aware of these facts (R.
204: 111). According to Scott, Kiriluk got the chemical from a friend who had got it
from some "Mexicans" (R. 204: 111). Scott understood that Kiriluk paid one hundred
dollars for the chemical and he still owed five hundred dollars (R. 204: 112). Scott
believed Kiriluk was concerned that if he did not repay the balance owing for the
chemicals his creditors "would come after him" (R. 204: 112).
Scott testified that she was with Kiriluk, Munford, and Rebecca Munford at
Kiriluk's apartment during the late afternoon hours of March 21, 1986 (R. 204: 113).
While they were in the apartment, Kiriluk told Scott to get a plastic trash bag and put it
on the floor in the bedroom and then put a chair on top of the bag (R. 204: 116). Scott
complied (R. 204: 116). At some point thereafter, Kiriluk and Munford left to get
Brown (R. 204: 116).
Eventually, Kiriluk and Munford returned with Brown (R. 204: 114). They sat
with Brown in the living room of the apartment while Scott and Rebecca Munford
stayed in the kitchen (R. 204: 114-15). As the three men sat in the living room, an
argument ensued between Kiriluk and Brown (R. 204: 114-15). Scott believed they
were arguing about where Hoge was (R. 204: 114). Munford also spoke a few words
to Brown, but was not arguing (R. 204: 114-15). After about fifteen or twenty
minutes, Kiriluk, Munford, and Brown went into the bedroom and closed the door (R.
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204: 115). About five or ten minutes later, Munford came out of the bedroom and
closed the door (R. 204: 117).
While Kiriluk was in the room with Brown, Scott testified that she heard some
loud voices (R. 204: 117). Kiriluk then came out of the room rubbing one of his hands
(R, 204: 117). Scott asked Kiriluk what happened and Kiriluk said he hit Brown (R.
204: 117). At that point, Scott walked into the bedroom and saw Brown sitting on the
chair that she placed in the bedroom (R. 204: 117-18). Brown was rubbing his face
and Scott observed that Brown's cheek and eye area appeared to be red (R. 204: 118).
Scott then saw Brown drop something (R. 204: 118). Scott asked Brown what he had
dropped and he said it was his tooth (R. 204: 118).
Scott came out of the bedroom and saw Kiriluk, Munford, and Brown putting on
their coats (R. 204: 118-19). Scott asked what they were doing and Kiriluk stated they
were going to Riverton to Hoge's parents home and asked if Scott would like to go (R.
204: 119).
Then Scott, Kiriluk, Brown, and Munford and his wife got into Rebecca
Munford's truck to leave (R. 204: 119). Rebecca Munford drove while Soctt sat in the
passenger seat and the three men sat in the bed of the truck (R. 204: 119).
Scott and the others drove to an area in Riverton that she recognized as an area
where Hoge's parents lived (R. 204: 120). However, when they got close to the
residence, Kiriluk told Rebecca Munford to go in a direction heading away from the
home and up into the hills (R. 204: 120-21). Scott testified that Munford told his wife
to drive up into the hills (R. 204: 121). Rebecca drove a "little ways" up the dirt road
and stopped while the men "relieved" themselves (R. 204: 121). Munford then told
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her to go up further and the truck finally stopped in an area which Scott described as
remote and desolate (R. 204: 122).
Scott observed Kiriluk and Munford get out the truck (R. 204: 122). Munford
went around to the driver's side while Kiriluk went to the passenger's side (R. 204:
122). Kiriluk then went to the driver's side of the truck and then he and Munford went
to the back of the truck and Kiriluk "got [Brown] out" (R. 204: 123). Scott testified
that Kiriluk, Munford, and Brown then walked away from the truck and that Munford
was "holding onto" Brown (R. 204: 123).
Scott testified that she had taken methamphetamine that day, and it was a dark
night with no moon (R. 204: 145). Scott testified that she sometimes hallucinated when
she used drugs (R. 204: 145). Scott also testified that she needed glasses but does not
have them and was not wearing them the night of the incident (R. 204: 153). Scott
further testified that she cannot see things far away (R. 204: 162). On the stand, Scott
was unable to see what type of pattern defense counsel was wearing (R. 204: 135).
After the three men walked away, Rebecca told Scott that she had forgotten to
give them the knife, so Scott called them back (R. 204: 124). Rebecca then gave Scott
a knife which Scott recognized as belonging to Rebecca (R. 204: 124). Either Kiriluk
or Munford came back to the truck at which time Scott handed over the knife (R. 204:
126). Scott then testified that the three men walked off down a hill (R. 204: 127). Scott
testified that she was scared, but that she had no reason to believe Brown would be
killed (R. 204: 128).
About ten minutes later, Kiriluk and Munford returned to the truck without
Brown (R. 204: 128). The four remaining people got into the front of the truck and
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Munford said, "It's done" (R. 204: 129). Rebecca Munford replied, "Good. Let's go."
(R. 204: 129).
On the drive home, Scott testified that Munford appeared excited and
commented that he had enjoyed the thrill, or words to that effect (R. 204: 130). Scott
also testified that Kiriluk asked for his shirt, and she reached under the seat and felt
what she thought was "the knife" that was wet and sticky and wrapped in what she
thought was a bandana (R. 204: 131). Scott also observed a tree branch on the seat of
the truck which was not there when they first left for Riverton (R. 204 132). Also, at
some point during the drive, Kiriluk gave Scott a hat which belonged to Brown and a
bandana with some of Brown's other personal belongings (R. 204: 132-33).
Eventually, they returned to Kiriluk's apartment (R. 204: 134). Upon arrival,
they immediately went into the bedroom and Scott took the bandana Kiriluk had given
her and put it on the foot of the bed (R. 204: 134). Kiriluk then unwrapped the
bandana and dumped out the contents (R. 204: 134). Scott then observed Brown's
rings, address book, wallet and "a few other things." (R. 204: 135). Kiriluk said those
items had to be burned to get rid of them and Munford agreed (R. 204: 135). Kiriluk
then went outside and, some time later, returned with a few items including the address
book and some papers (R. 204: 135-36). Scott and Rebecca then took the remaining
items and burned them at Kiriluk's demand (R. 204: 136).

D. Testimony of Rebecca Munford
Rebecca Munford testified that she had been married to Munford for about six
years (R. 204: 163). She also said that she had known Kiriluk for about a week and a
half prior to March 2 1, 1986 (R. 204: 165). Rebecca confirmed that Kiriluk and
9

Munford were friends and that on the night of the incident, Kiriluk asked Munford to
be his "backup muscle" (R. 204: 165). Rebecca testified that she was aware that
Brown had taken some chemicals for Kiriluk and had not been able to recover them (R.
204: 166-67).
Rebecca testified that she was at Kiriluk's apartment on the late afternoon of
March 21, 1986 with Kiriluk, Munford, and Scott (R. 204: 168). Rebecca saw Kiriluk
and Munford leave the apartment and she understood they were going to get Brown to
discuss the missing chemicals (R. 204: 168). The first time when Rebecca met Brown
was when Kiriluk and Munford returned with to the apartment (R. 204: 169).
According to Rebecca, Kiriluk was in the living room with Brown discussing the
missing chemicals (R. 204: 169). Kiriluk appeared to be upset (R. 204: 170). Rebecca
testified that Munford stayed in the kitchen and only went into the living room once or
twice (R. 204: 170). Rebecca testified that Kiriluk and Brown went into the bedroom
(R. 204: 170). Rebecca testified Kiriluk and Brown were the only ones who went into
the bedroom; Munford did not (R. 204: 170).
After about fifteen or twenty minutes, Rebecca testified that she heard a thump
and she, Munford, and Scott went to see what happened (R. 204: 171). Kiriluk stated
that he knocked Brown's tooth out (R. 204: 171). After thai, Brown and Kiriluk went
back the living room and Kiriluk continued to express his dissatisfaction about the
missing chemicals (R. 204: 171). After about twenty minutes, Kiriluk suggested that
they go to Hoge's house to recover his property (R. 204: 172).
The five of them got into Rebecca's truck and headed for Hoge's house (R. 204:
173). When they approached the area where Rebecca understood Hoge lived, Kiriluk
said, "Forget it. This guy is just messing with us, let's go up in the hills" (R. 204:
10

193). She then drove the truck up a dirt road (R. 204: 174). After an unknown
distance, she stopped the truck and Kiriluk told spoke Rebecca continue up and around
a bend (R. 204: 175). Rebecca again stopped the truck and Kiriluk and Munford got
out (R. 204: 176).
Rebecca testified that at this point, Munford told her that he loved her and
Kiriluk was joking around (R. 204: 176). Kiriluk then asked Rebecca for her knife,
which she always carries a knife for protection (R. 204: 176). Rebecca testified that
Kiriluk "grabbed my purse" and dumped it out took the knife from her (R. 204: 178).
Rebecca testified that Kiriluk told Brown, "Let's go for a walk" (R. 204: 178).
Kiriluk and Brown walked side by side and Munford "was kind of behind [Brown], off
to one side (R. 204: 178). They walked over a hill and were out of sight (R. 204:
179). About twenty minutes later, Kiriluk and Munford returned without Brown (R.
204: 179). The four remaining adults then drove back to Kiriluk1 s apartment (R. 204:
181). During the drive back, Rebecca testified that Kiriluk and Munford appeared
nervous (R. 204: 181).
When they reached the apartment, Kiriluk went to the bathroom while the other
three went to the bedroom (R. 204: 181). Kiriluk then came into the bedroom and put
Rebecca's knife in front of her (R. 204: 183). Rebecca explained that one should not
put a knife away wet so she pulled it out of the scabbard wiped it off and put it back
into her purse (R. 204: 183). Rebecca testified that Kiriluk had Brown's hat, address
book, two lighters, and three rings (R. 204: 184). Kiriluk then expressed that they
needed to dispose of Brown's belongings (R. 204: 184). Kiriluk then went to the
parking lot and attempted to bum them (R. 204: 184). Given that the items were not
readily susceptible to incineration, Kiriluk was only partially successful (R. 204: 184).
11

Kiriluk returned, put the remaining items in a bag and instructed Scott and Rebecca to
get rid of them (R. 204: 184). Scott and Rebecca did as instructed (R. 204: 185).

E, Testimony of Deputy Sheriff Darren Carr
Deputy Car testified that on March 22, 1986, he was called out to Bluff dale were
some people had found a body (R. 204: 196). The body was found down off a hill
about 10 yards from a dirt road (R. 204: 198). The officer's description of the area
was consistent with the area that Scott and Rebecca described as last having seen Brown
(R. 204: 197-98).
Deputy Carr testified that the body he observed had a black eye, a missing tooth
and a gaping wound to the neck (R. 204: 200). Ultimately, the deputy was able to
determine that the body he located was in fact the body of Brown (R. 204: 204). While
at the scene, Deputy Carr also observed two rocks which were found approximately six
feet above Mr. Brown's head (R. 204: 202). Both of the rocks had blood on them (R.
204: 202). During the course of the investigation Rebecca Munford's knife was
recovered (R. 204: 214). Kiriluk's fingerprint was found on the knife (R. 204: 215).

F. Testimony of expert witness Dn Edward Leis
Dr. Leis testified that he is the State's deputy chief medical examiner (R. 205:
17-18). Dr. Leis examined Brown's body on March 23, 1986 (R. 205: 20). During
his examination, Dr. Leis observed two sets of major injuries (R. 205: 22-3). The
first was a laceration and skull fractures on the back of Brown's head (R. 205: 22-4).
Dr. Leis opined that those injuries could have been caused by the rocks deputy Carr
found by Brown's body (R. 205: 24-5). Dr. Leis also observed a large gaping wound
12

of the body, Dr. Leis concluded that Brown's death was caused by the injury to his
neck(R. 205:31).
Dr. Leis could not determine which injury came first, but he gave his opinion
that the injury to the back of the head came first (R. 205: 30). Dr. Leis testified that
the injuries to the back of the head probably would not have been fatal (R. 205: 32-3).
Dr. Leis also testified that it was more likely that the injuries to the head resulted from
the victim falling down and striking an object on the ground (R. 205: 33-6).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State's entire case against Munford boiled down to one simple proposition:
Munford must be guilty because he was present when Brown was killed. However, the
State's case against Munford does not constitute a crime because merely being present
when a crime is committed, even with prior knowledge that the crime was going to take
place, is not a crime. The evidence offered was insufficient to establish that Munford
intentionally participated in the crime charged. Thus, the trial court erred in submitting
the case to the jury. Furthermore, Munford was denied effective assistance of counsel
because his counsel failed to make a motion for a directed verdict when the evidence
was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. The jury's verdict was unreasonable and
should be vacated.

13

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT
MUNFORD INTENTIONALLY PARTICIPATED IN THE MURDER
The state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Munford was guilty of
murder. Although Munford's counsel failed to motion for a directed verdict at the
close of the State's case, it was plain error for the trial court to submit the case to the
jury because there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict.
An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the defendant can
demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' occurred." State v.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 111, 10 P.3d 346 (citing Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,
1022 (Utah 1996); and State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)).
To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency claim, "a defendant
must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime
charged...." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, at f 17. "To demonstrate that the evidence is
insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and them demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT
98, 114, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799
(Utah 1991)). Then the defendant must show "that the insufficiency was so obvious
and fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Holgate,
2000 UT 74, at 117.
A review of all the evidence shows that another person, Kiriluk, not Munford,
killed Brown. Moreover, Munford did not act as an accomplice or partner in the
killing of Brown.
14

A person commits murder if he or she:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; [or]
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to
another and thereby causes the death of another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(l)(a)-(c). Additionally, a person who does not directly
cause the death of another may also be found guilty of murder as an accomplice if
"acting with the mental state required for the commission of [murder]," he or she
"solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to
engage" in committing the murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202.
"As with any other crime, the State must prove the elements of accomplice
liability beyond a reasonable doubt." State ex. rel. V.T., 2000 UT App 189, 19, 5
P.3d 1234. "Mere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make one an
accomplice when he neither advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in perpetration of
the crime." State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980). Rather, "there must
be evidence showing that the defendant engaged in some active behavior, or at least
speech or other expression that served to assist or encourage the primary perpetrators in
committing the crime." V.T., 2000 UT App 189, at 116.
In State ex. rel. V.T., 2002 UT App 189, the defendant and two friends went to
a relative's apartment. Id. at 12. The relative left for a short period of time and when
she returned the boys were gone and so were two of her guns. Id. at 13. The relative
tracked the boys down and demanded they returned her property. Id. The boys
refused and the relative reported the theft to the police. Id. Two days later, the
relative found that her camcorder was missing. Id. at 14. The police recovered the
camcorder at a pawnshop, and inside the camcorder found a videotape. Id. The tape
15

had a recorded conversation where one of the defendant's friends telephoned another
friend, in the defendant's presence, and discussed pawning the stolen camcorder. Id. at
^5. The defendant never spoke or gestured during any of this footage. Id.
This Court vacated the defendant's conviction of the theft of the camcorder
finding that the evidence did not support the charge. Id. at ifl7. The evidence showed
only that the defendant "was present with the other two youths, albeit at multiple
times," such as before, during, and after the theft of the camcorder. Id. at 1fl8.
Further, there was "no indication ... that [defendant] had instigated, incited to action,
emboldened, helped, or advised the other two boys in planning or committing the
theft." Id. The circumstantial evidence showed only that the defendant was a
"witness—not an accomplice—to the theft of the camcorder." Id.
This Court's ruling in V.T. was based in part on State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120
(Utah App. 1998). In Labrum, the defendant was convicted of criminal homicide
stemming from his involvement in a drive by shooting. Id. at 122. The defendant's
sentence was enhanced because the crime was allegedly committed with two or more
people. Id. at 123-24. This Court found that the other witness "had been present
before, during, and after the shooting and later was in defendant's presence when he
boasted to a third party about the shooting." Id. Even though the witness endorsed the
boasting, this Court held these findings "were insufficient to show that he solicited,
requested, commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided" the defendant in
committing the shooting. Id.
In the present case, marshaling all the evidence in favor of the verdict does not
support the jury's conclusion. The damaging evidence against Munford was primarily
the testimony of Chablis Scott, Kiriluk's girlfriend (R. 204: 108).
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The sum of Scott's testimony that can be viewed against Munford is insufficient
to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Scott testified that Munford was Kiriluk's
"backup, his tough guy" (R. 204: 109). Scott testified that although Kiriluk directed
Rebecca Munford to drive past their intended destination, it was allegedly Munford that
told Rebecca to drive up into the hills (R. 204: 121). Scott also testified that Munford
was "holding onto" Brown as they walked away from the car out of sight (R. 204:
123). Scott farther testified that when Kiriluk and Munford returned without Brown,
that Munford said "It's done" (R. 204: 129).
It was also uncontradicted that Munford was present with the assailant and
victime before, during, and after the crime.
From this evidence, the State argued that either Munford committed the crime or
that he was an accomplice. This evidence alone is insufficient to support either
proposition. Even if Munford approved of the crime, this is insufficient evidence to
support the jury verdict. See Labrum, 959 P.2d at 123-24. Even if Munford was
Kiriluk's tough guy, this does not satisfy the theory of accomplice liability. Scott
merely testified that Munford was holding onto Brown; she did not testify that he
dragged Brown or that Brown was unwilling to go. In fact, Scott failed to testify that
Munford showed or used any force with Brown (R. 204: 123).
Also, both Scott and Rebecca Munford testified that they thought Kiriluk was
only going to attempt to scare Brown (R. 204: 128, 191-92). Even if Munford directed
his wife to drive up further into the hills, there is no reason to believe that Kiriluk
intended to commit the crime he did. In fact, Rebecca Munford directly contradicted
Scott's testimony at this point, and stated that it was Kiriluk (R. 204: 175, 193).
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Rebecca also stated that it was Kiriluk who was walking with Brown, not Munford (R.
204: 178).
Moreover, the fact that Munford was with the victim before and during the
crime is insufficient to establish guilt. In V, T., the evidence also established that the
defendant was present before and during the crime. 2002 UT App 189 at if 18. Just
like V. T., the circumstantial evidence in this case indicates that Munford did not
instigate, incite to action, embolden, help, or advise Kiriluk in this crime.
The circumstantial evidence shows at most that Munford was a witness to a
crime. There was no evidence indicating that he directly participated in any crime. At
most, the evidence showed that Munford helped or escorted Brown while walking (R.
204: 123). The evidence did show that Munford was not in the room when Kiriluk hit
Brown, knocking out his tooth (R.204: 117). The evidence did show that Kiriluk's
fingerprints were found on the alleged weapon (R. 204: 215). The evidence did show
that the slit to the throat caused Brown's death (R. 205: 27). The State's own expert
testified that "a fall would be more likely an explanation" 1o explain the bumps on
Brown's head and thus the blood on the rocks (R. 205: 35).
Thus, the evidence shows that Munford neither stabbed Brown with the knife,
nor hit Brown on the head with rocks. The evidence does not support that Munford
was an accomplice. Munford was only a witness to a crime.
The fact that Munford witnessed a crime is insufficient to find him guilty of a
crime. There was insufficient evidence to show that Munford solicited, requested,
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided Kiriluk in committing the crime. It is
evident that the trial court committed plain error in submitting this case to the jury.
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POINT II
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A DIRECTED
VERDICT CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Munford was denied effective assistance of counsel when his counsel failed to
motion for a directed verdict at the end of the State's case.
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a
conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); see Tillman v.
Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on
failure to move to dismiss where evidence to convict was sufficient). In order to
establish ineffective counsel, it is the defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and second, that
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, 125, 1
P.3d 546 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah 1994); see also
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State
v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 1989).
If this Court finds that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, then
under the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in Cook, the two prong test set out in
Strickland is satisfied. Because the evidence was insufficient to submit this case to the
jury, Munford's counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of
professional judgment." Kelley, 2000 UT 41, at 1f25. Additionally, but for the failure
to make a motion for a directed verdict, Munford would not have been convicted of
murder.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Munford asks that this Court vacate his conviction of
murder, a first degree felony.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 21st day of February, 2003.

largarefP. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

76-5-203

(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the
(xnl aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405;
defendant's own conduct.
(xvii) aggravated arson, Section 76-6-103;
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse
(xviii) aggravated burglary, Section 76-6-203;
under Subsection (3)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the
(xix) aggravated robbery, Section 76-6-302; or
actor under Subsection (3)(a)(ii) shall be determined from
(xx) an offense committed in another jurisdiction
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then
which if committed in this state would be a violation
easting circumstances.
of a crime listed in Subsection (l)(h);
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as
) the homicide was committed for the purpose of:
follows:
(i) preventing a witness from testifying;
(i) aggravated murder to murder; and
(ii) preventing a person from providing evidence or
(ii) attempted aggravated murder to attempted
participating in any legal proceedings or official inmurder.
2001
vestigation;
(iii) retaliating against a person for testifying, pro- 76-5-203. Murder.
viding evidence, or participating in any legal proceed(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means:
ings or official investigation; or
(a) violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandes(iv) disrupting or hindering any lawful governtine Drug Lab Act;
mental function or enforcement of laws;
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2Xa), when
j) the victim is or has been a local, state, or federal
the victim is younger than 18 years of age;
>lic official, or a candidate for public office, and the
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;
aicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;
cial position, act, capacity, or candidacy;
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;
a) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforce(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;
nt officer, executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer,
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;
son official, firefighter, judge or other court official,
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;
)r, probation officer, or parole officer, and the victim is
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;
ler on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse
elated to that official position, and the actor knew, or
of a child under Section 76-5-404.1;
sonably should have known, that the victim holds or
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402;
held that official position;
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;
) the homicide was committed by means of a destruc(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405;
> device, bomb, explosive, incendiary device, or similar
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102;
ice which was planted, hidden, or concealed in any
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;
ce, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or was mailed
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;
lelivered;
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;
m) the homicide was committed during the act of
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301;
awfully assuming control of any aircraft, train, or
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or
er public conveyance by use of threats or force with
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8}ht to obtain any valuable consideration for the release
309.
he public conveyance or any passenger, crew member,
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:
any other person aboard, or to direct the route or
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the
cement of the public conveyance or otherwise exert
death of another;
trol over the public conveyance;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another,
a) the homicide was committed by means of the adthe actor commits an act clearly dangerous to human life
listration of a poison or of any lethal substance or of
that causes the death of another;
r substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage,
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
quantity;
indifference to human life, the actor engages in conduct
}) the victim was a person held or otherwise detained
which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
a shield, hostage, or for ransom; or
causes the death of another;
p) the homicide was committed in an especially hei-\
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, atis, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner,
tempted commission, or immediate flight from the
£ of which must be demonstrated by physical torture,
commission or attempted commission of any predilous physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the
cate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; and
tim before death.
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in
£gravated murder is a capital felony.
Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the com*) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated
mission, attempted commission, or immediate flight
fder or attempted aggravated murder that the defenfrom the commission or attempted commission of any
Jt caused the death of another or attempted to cause
predicate offense;
yieath of another:
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace
|f '(i) under the influence of extreme emotional disofficer
while in the commission or attempted commission
tress for which there is a reasonable explanation or
of:
iexcuse; or
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section
pi (ii) under a reasonable belief that the circum76-5-102.4; or
stances provided a legal justification or excuse for his
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making
I n d u c t although the conduct was not legally justifia lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 if the actor
able or excusable under the existing circumstances.
uses force against a peace officer;
J Under Subsection (3)(a)(i), emotional distress does
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated
delude:
murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection
r , i a con dition resulting from mental illness as
76-5-202(3); or
Refined in Section 76-2-305; or

76-5-204

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special
mitigation is established under Section 76-5-205.5.
(3) Murder is a first degree felony.
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or
attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of
another or attempted to cause the death of another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse; or
(ii) under a reasonable belief t h a t the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for his
conduct although t h e conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does
not include:
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as
defined in Section 76-2-305; or
(ii) distress t h a t is substantially caused by the
defendant's own conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse
under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the reasonable belief of the
actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from
t h e viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then
existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as
follows:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.
2000

76-5-204. Death of other than intended victim no defense.
In any prosecution for criminal homicide, evidence that the
actor caused the death of a person other t h a n the intended
victim shall not constitute a defense for any purpose to
criminal homicide.
1973
76-5-205. Manslaughter.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another;
(b) commits a homicide which would be murder, but the
offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(4); or
(c) commits murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 76-5-205.5.
(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.
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(4) (a) I f t h e trier of fact finds the elements of an offense a
listed in Subsection (4)(b) are proven beyond a reasonably
doubt, and also t h a t t h e existence of special mitigation
under this section is established by a preponderance nf
t h e evidence, it shall return a verdict on the reduced
charge as provided in Subsection (4)(b).
(b) If under Subsection (4)(a) the offense is:
(i) aggravated murder, the defendant shall instead
be found guilty of murder;
(ii) attempted aggravated murder, the defendant
shall instead be found guilty of attempted murder
(iii) murder, the defendant shall instead be found
guilty of manslaughter; or
(iv) attempted murder, the defendant shall instead
be found guilty of attempted manslaughter.
(5) (a) If a j u r y is the trier of fact, a unanimous vote of the
j u r y is required to establish t h e existence of the special
mitigation.
(b) If the j u r y does find special mitigation by a unanimous vote, it shall return a verdict on the reduced charge
as provided in Subsection (4).
(c) If the j u r y finds by a unanimous vote that special
mitigation h a s not been established, it shall convict the
defendant of t h e greater offense for which the prosecution
h a s established all the elements beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(d) If t h e j u r y is unable to unanimously agree whether
or not special mitigation h a s been established, the result
is a h u n g jury.
(6> (a) If the issue of special mitigation is submitted to the
trier of fact, it shall r e t u r n a special verdict indicating
whether the existence of special mitigation has been
found.
(b) The trier of fact shall r e t u r n the special verdict at
the same time as the general verdict, to indicate the basis
for its general verdict.
(7) Special mitigation under this section does not, in any
case, reduce the level of an offense by more than one degree
from t h a t offense, the elements of which the evidence has
established beyond a reasonable doubt.
iw*
76-5-206. N e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e .
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide ifthe
actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of
another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
i973

* 2001 (1st S.S.)

76-5-205.5. Special m i t i g a t i o n r e d u c i n g t h e l e v e l of
criminal h o m i c i d e offense — B u r d e n of proof

— Application

to reduce

offense,

(1) Special mitigation exists when:
(a) the actor causes the death of another under circumstances that are not legally justified, but the actor acts
under a delusion attributable to a mental illness as
defined in Section 76-2-305; and
(b) the nature of the delusion is such that, if the facts
existed as the defendant believed them to be in his
delusional state, those facts would provide a legal justification for his conduct.
(2) This section applies only if the defendant's actions, in
light of his delusion, were reasonable from the objective
viewpoint of a reasonable person.
(3) A defendant who was under the influence of voluntarily
consumed, injected, or ingested alcohol, controlled substances,
or volatile substances at the time of the alleged offense may
not claim mitigation of the offense under this section on the
basis of mental illness if the alcohol or substance caused,
triggered, or substantially contributed to the mental illness.

76-5-207. A u t o m o b i l e h o m i c i d e .
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third
degree felony, if the actor operates a motor vehicle while
having a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by
weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a
degree t h a t renders the actor incapable of safely opera ing the vehicle, and causes the death of another y
operating the vehicle in a negligent manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection,
^^f^
m e a n s simple negligence, the failure to exercise
degree of care t h a t reasonable a n d prudent persons exe cise under like or similar circumstances.
J
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a seco^
degree felony, if the actor operates a motor vehicle w
having a blood alcohol content of .08% or ^ r e a t ^ r U g (
weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any
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or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug,
degree t h a t renders the actor incapable of safev ?P ^
ing the vehicle, and causes t h e death of ano
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